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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Stephen Devereux noted that ‘…
the “cash versus food” debate has become
unnecessarily polarised, even acrimonious. It is also
spurious and misdirected’ (Devereux 2006). While
there are solid reasons to agree with Devereux, this
note argues that there is scope to make the debate
productive – and even turn it into an opportunity –
by adopting a more balanced, context-specific and
evidence-based approach.
This brief article conveys three simple and interlinked
messages. First, cash and food are just instruments
and not strategies. Sustainable food and nutrition
security gains can only be achieved if instruments are
coherently nested within broader emergency
preparedness, food security and social protection
strategies. Second, instrument selection should not
be the input, but rather the natural output of sound
context-specific assessments. Finally, cash and food
can be complementary and mutually reinforcing
instruments. Even within a country, conditions in
markets and capacities (e.g. distribution of banking
facilities) may vary considerably, hence suggesting
that there are opportunities to combine them more
creatively.
2 When is food appropriate?
Food transfers, cash transfers and food stamps have
both common and specific features. All these
features should, however, be interpreted in the light
of local conditions. Appropriateness cannot be
assumed a priori. Whether cash and/or food transfers
are the most appropriate instruments hinges, for
example, on programme objectives, markets,
capacities, beneficiary preferences and cost efficiency
(Gentilini 2007).
Before briefly exploring some of these domains, a
caveat should be kept in mind, namely that
methodological factors may sometimes hinder
comparisons between food and cash transfers. These
factors may include, for example, the simultaneous
implementation of cash in contexts of larger-scale
food transfer programmes,1 methods employed for
calculating the cash transfer size, and a ‘natural
selection’ of areas thought to be suitable for
implementing cash transfers.
That said, programme objective is one of the issues
that should be given utmost attention in transfer
selection, as overall the effectiveness and efficiency
of transfers relate – by definition – to whether and
how objectives are met. While it is always
complicated to make cost comparisons, studies have
estimated that transferring cash is less costly
operationally than distributing food (e.g. 5–10 per
cent less than locally procured foods). In some other
cases, cash transfers have been found to be more
efficient in the design phase, but not in the
implementation phase (Harvey and Savage 2006).
An effective and efficient programme, however, is
not just a cheaper one. For example, in a
maternal–child health programme in Honduras, it
cost 1.03 lempiras to deliver 1 lempira of income
transfer in the form of a cash-like coupon, while it
cost 5.69 lempiras to deliver the same income
transfer in the form of food. However, the cash
transfer had no effect on child calorie consumption
nor on the use of health centres, while the food
transfer increased both (Rogers and Coates 2002).
Programme objectives should always be clearly set
out in order to facilitate programme evaluation.
2.1 Economics
In economic theory, cash is a more appropriate
instrument because consumers’ utility increases as
the result of more choice and fungibility (i.e. resulting
in a parallel shift of the whole budget line). If,
however, a programme objective is to increase food
consumption, evidence shows that appropriateness
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depends on the size of the transfer: if the food
transfer is extra-marginal then food is more effective
than cash; if infra-marginal then they are
economically equivalent.2
Cash leaves to traders the supply of commodities,
hence it becomes crucial to understand how markets
function in a given context. In this sense, cash
provides people with choice but it also transfers to
them the risk of supply failures. Such a risk is
minimised by providing cash in situations where
markets work reasonably well, but providing food
where market risk is high, i.e. where markets work
poorly or are temporarily disrupted. However, there
are also cases where food may be an appropriate
tool even where markets work well (e.g. fortified
foods for therapeutic nutrition). Conversely, cash may
also work when markets are not perfectly
integrated, but niches of vibrant economic activity do
exist. Perfect markets do not exist in practice, and a
more pragmatic approach could be to identify the
‘degree of imperfection’ of markets, rather than a
‘yes/no’ approach against a hypothetical benchmark.
The issue is further complicated by the need to
understand not only how markets work in general,
but also the extent to which they work for the poor
in particular. In the words of Donovan et al. (2005),
‘markets only serve those who have effective
demand – reinforced by purchasing power. [This
excludes] the destitute – those who have real needs
but lack the purchasing power to make their needs
felt in the market’. In emergencies, traders may or
may not have the incentives to respond to cash
injections, basically depending on their risk and cost
calculations. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath
of an emergency, markets are almost always
disrupted, especially in a chronically food insecure
context. Hence cash may not be the right tool in
those times and circumstances.
Multiplier effects do also relate to markets. Three
issues need to be clarified here. First, possible market
distortions revolve around programme design and
additionality, and not necessarily around the type of
transfer. Second, quantifying multipliers needs
information which often is simply not available,
especially in emergencies. For example, in Malawi
and Zambia ‘neither [cash] country programme could
confidently answer the critical questions of how
much people were paying for food, and where they
were buying it’ (Harvey and Savage 2006: 6). Third,
multipliers are not generated by transfers per se, but
by the way transfers are provided. Especially crucial
are the size, frequency and predictability of transfers,
which are likely to impact significantly on investment
behaviour.
2.2 Nutrition
The multidimensional nature of nutrition suggests
that the impact of transfers on nutrition depends on
many factors, which are often difficult to control for
statistically. Moreover, it is crucial to define how
nutrition is measured, and whether transfers are
conditional on attendance at health centres (e.g. as
with Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico). If we
measure the anthropometric impact of unconditional
emergency transfers, then evidence of cash transfers’
impact is very scarce; rather, there are documented
examples of positive impact of food transfers on
child growth and nutrition (Yamano et al. 2005;
Quisumbing 2003).
If the proxy for nutrition is kilocalorie availability at
the household level, than cash can translate into
nutritional gains if people buy calorie-intensive foods
such as eggs and meat. The extent to which this
happens depends on the specific compensations
across the board between foods in the household,
and whether households are liquidity-constrained
(Sharma 2006). If nutrition is measured with the
marginal propensity to consume food, than there is
unambiguous evidence that food is significantly more
effective than cash (Barrett 2002).
While it is documented that households generally
spend cash transfers wisely – devoting around 50–60
per cent of it for food – more research is needed to
understand its impact on nutrition, although the
short-term nature of most cash pilot projects makes
this task difficult. Future pilots should seek to address
this key knowledge gap.
2.3 Social protection
The discussion over cash and food transfers is also
intrinsically linked to the design of longer-term social
protection strategies, and cash is increasingly
becoming the ‘central plank’ of some donors’ social
policy. For example, DFID is committed to
‘significantly increase spending on social protection in
at least ten countries in Africa and Asia by 2009
…[and in Africa] to double to 16 million the number
of people moved from emergency relief to long term
social protection programmes by 2009’ (DFID 2006).
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The commitment is about reducing the need for
large volumes of recurrent relief, whether in food or
cash. It would not change much if recurrent appeals
for food transfers were to be replaced by recurrent
appeals for cash transfers. Social protection is about
addressing predictable needs with predictable and
institutionalised resources. In Ethiopia’s Productive
Safety Net Programme (PSNP), over the
2005–2006 period, many of the beneficiaries initially
receiving cash transfers opted to switch in favour of
food transfers, hence warning against bold and
preconceived ideas about how cash-intensive social
protection systems should be.3
While there is nothing esoteric in social protection
strategies that enshrine a general ‘cash first
principle’, it is also important to be pragmatic and
patient; addressing the structural causes of food
insecurity takes time, and policy innovations should
be sequential and progressive.
Meanwhile, heterogeneous intra- and inter-country
market conditions and capacities call for dynamic and
complementary roles to be played by both food and
cash transfers. This is also coherent with what
beneficiaries seem to prefer, which is not fixed but
tends to vary according to location, season and
gender (Devereux 2006; Figure 1).
3 Politics and attitudes
We often hear questions about ‘why isn’t cash on the
agenda’? Good question: cash seems underutilised and
should be more widely considered in both emergency
and development programming. However, despite
Harvey (2005) cautioning us to ‘beware of cash
evangelism’, certain forms of cash advocacy seem to
fuel an anti-food movement, questioning ‘why is food
on the agenda’? I am exaggerating here, just to make
the point, but there is some truth in there.
It is certainly positive that cash transfers are given
more visibility and it is encouraging that agencies
may be better placed in the future to respond flexibly
to identified needs. It is of concern, however, that
some cash proponents have got ahead of the
evidence. It is scientifically proven, for instance, that
claims about negative affects of targeted food
transfers tend to be based on anecdotes and
superficial analysis, rather than on systematic and
detailed evidence (Abdulai et al. 2005; Barrett and
Maxwell 2005; Del Ninno et al. 2005). Similarly, a
recent review by the Regional Hunger and
Vulnerability Programme (RHVP) on the impact of
food transfers on markets in Southern Africa finds
‘either no effect or a positive effect on production
[and] the conclusion seems to be that, in the
absence of food aid, the decline of African
agriculture might have been even more precipitous’
(Maunder 2006). In other words, unfortunately fears
often prevail over evidence.
4 Conclusion
Transfer selection needs to be subordinated to
context analysis, and to be well nested within
broader emergency preparedness, food security and
social protection strategies. Table 1 provides three
reasons for prudence, and three for optimism for the
future of the cash and food arena.
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Figure 1 Beneficiaries’ preferences
Food Cash
Location
Gender
Season
Near
markets
Men
Harvest 
period
Remote
Women
‘Hungry’
season
Debating the appropriateness of cash and food
transfers with a more balanced, context-specific and
evidence-based approach may be an opportunity to
translate the possible reasons behind optimism into
facts, and to archive reasons for prudence as myths.
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Table 1 A ‘prudent but optimistic’ approach to the cash and food debate
Reasons for prudence Reasons for optimism
Robustness of the evidence: With the exception of Complementarities: Wide variation in programme 
a few cases, cash transfers have been self-evaluated objectives, market conditions and capacity levels in 
and often lack panel data and multivariate most countries suggest that cash and food can be 
quantitative analysis. creatively combined both spatially and temporally. 
An ‘either-or’ approach is unnecessarily extreme.
Micro cash pilots: For the most part, cash transfers Social protection: Both cash and food transfers 
are implemented as small-scale and short-term pilot require a whole set of common processes, such as 
projects, therefore lessons cannot be generalised, needs assessments, monitoring of markets, emergency 
whether positive or negative. preparedness mechanisms, contingency plans,
targeting and exit strategies. This common platform is 
a key component of social protection strategies, which 
further strengthens and facilitates complementarities 
in a more coordinated way.
Capacities: Pressure is rising to scale-up small cash Outdated dichotomies: Both cash and food transfers
pilots, but limited capacities on the ground are often seem to work in both emergency and development 
a binding constraint for managing larger cash contexts, although with some caveats.
programmes. There are no substitutes for ex ante
capacity-building efforts.
Notes
* Ugo Gentilini is with the Social Protection and
Livelihoods Service of the World Food
Programme (WFP). Any views expressed here are
the personal views of the author and should not
be attributed to WFP.
1 For instance, Adams and Kebede (2005: 29) noted
that in Ethiopia ‘… the mixing of cash and food
relief within an area means that the cash pilots
have not really tested the inflationary potential of
cash and the ability of markets to respond’.
2 A transfer is ‘extra-marginal’ when it is greater
than the amount the recipient household would
have consumed without the transfer (a transfer
for an amount less than the normal food
expenditure is said to be ‘infra-marginal’). It should
be noted that the extra-marginal argument holds
to the extent that resale is prohibited or if it
entails high transaction costs.
3 In early 2005, cash covered around 70 per cent of
the 8.2 million Productive Safety Net Programme
(PSNP) beneficiaries, while by the end of 2006
cash beneficiaries constituted around 45 per cent
of the caseload.
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